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The first duty of architecture, wrote Le Corbusier in 1923 as he contemplated post-war 
reconstruction, was to advance a revolutionary ‗revision of values [as to] … the 
constituent elements of the house‘ - to create the ‗spirit of constructing‘, living in‘ and 
‗conceiving mass-production houses‘.1  In Britain, however, the approach to using new 
methods of construction after 1918 has been characterised as being ‗unusually level-
headed‘ and pragmatic towards a development often treated polemically by ‗the avant-
garde abroad‘ or ‗architectural reactionaries at home‘.2  Yet one might also question 
whether and how ‗modern‘ ideas were diffused locally amongst potential purchasers. As 
one provincial newspaper commented in the midst of an intense local media campaign to 
force the civic adoption of new housing technology: ‗Every time we go to a Municipal 
function, anywhere in the country, we hear this phrase – ―We now have the very best 
(something or other) in the country.‖  This is said because Councillors are not sufficiently 
familiar with what other places are doing.‘3  Indeed, perhaps rational selection and the 
implied centrality of local authorities to decision-making were largely irrelevant.  
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Arguably, non-traditional housing methods were more centrally imposed on local 
authorities: the product of the imbalance of power between town halls and Whitehall, and 
particularly the centrally-led promotion of the new building technology. 
This article, in examining the diversities of local circumstances from a civic 
perspective, re-evaluates this central-local relationship politically, as it affected the 
decision-making processes of local authority housing purchasers in the 1920s.  It assesses, 
too, the impact of ‗dominant‘ opinion forming ideas and contexts locally—particularly 
civic self-view as mediated through the press—against other determining factors.  
Located in the economically prosperous East Midlands, Leicester and Nottingham (with 
populations of 234,143 and 262,624 in 1921) occupied a broadly equal position within 
the central-local government hierarchy. Each vied for regional leadership and presented 
themselves as progressive authorities.  Both were to embrace non-traditional ideas, yet 
although only 25 miles apart, the circumstances and scale of that adoption varied 
significantly.  In each city a ‗new spirit‘ of technological utility and experiment was 
apparent, but—critically—its application, it will be argued, was tied to contradictory 
perceptions of civic achievement. 
 
 
Central-Local Influences and Housing  
Paradoxically, while Britain fell behind architecturally in adopting modernism during the 
inter-war period, it was to the fore in experimenting with concrete and steel housing 
immediately after 1918.  Here, ‗mass production and prefabrication as a rational outcome 
of the housing and labour shortages were not specifically considered, but the need for 
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lessening site work and using surplus [war] materials‘ was.4  By 1919 the building crafts 
labour force stood some 45 per cent below pre-war levels.  Shortages were compounded 
by the financial unattractiveness of local authority housing against other building work, 
which persisted beyond the construction boom of 1919-21. A subsequent contraction in 
building activity after 1921, when the state curtailed its escalating liabilities for working-
class housing under the 1919 Housing Act, further depleted the skills base, as labour left 
the industry and fewer apprenticeships were offered. Renewed local authority expansion 
in house building from late 1923 onwards, therefore, ‗came at the worst possible time‘.5  
A political awareness of this dilemma already existed at the highest level.  State 
funding during reconstruction had extended beyond direct subsidy intervention in the 
housing market into supply-side measures that established research progammes to 
promote standardisation and the use of new methods more economical in scarce 
resources.6   Neville Chamberlain particularly wanted ‗one or two mass production 
schemes‘ to encourage the use of unskilled labour.7  Churchill, as Chancellor, was less 
hesitant still in proposing the use of alternative methods, complaining that Chamberlain 
was only experimenting ‗on a tiny scale‘. Chamberlain, however, favoured diffusion 
through local initiative rather than central imposition: a formula handicapped by the 
                                                 
4
 D. Dex Harrison, J.M. Albery and M.W. Whiting, A Survey of Prefabrication (London, 1945), pp.4-5. 
5
 S. Merrett, State Housing in Britain (London, 1979), pp. 36-40; H.W. Richardson and D.H. Aldcroft, 
Building in the British Economy between the Wars (London, 1968), pp. 123-6. 
6
 See particularly, R.B. White, Prefabrication (London, 1965), ch. 1 & 2. 
7
 PRO, HLG 52/771, letter from Sheepshank to Moir, 24 Nov. 1924; HC Debs., Vol. 179, cols 858-9, 16 
Dec. 1924.  Chamberlain was Minister of Health in 1923, and from 1924-29. 
 4 
reluctance of many local authorities to become engaged in solutions where disputes over 
dilution and demarcation still existed.8  
While, therefore, there were self-imposed limits to the direct impact of government 
measures to promote non-traditional methods, in a broader cultural sense by the mid 
1920s ‗theories of social and industrial progress … had increasingly connected mass 
production and housing in the beliefs of the political establishment‘. Ministry staff, too, 
championed non-traditional solutions.9  Dunleavy attributes the adoption of non-
traditional housing to the prevalence and influence of such discourses centrally, which, 
through their structural authority, effectively marginalised civic autonomy and bypassed 
rational decision-making.10  Certainly non-traditional methods offered little by way of 
cost-savings and later acquired a chequered reputation technically.  Once local labour 
conditions permitted, the authority of such arguments diminished and most housing 
agencies reverted to brick construction.11  Central imposition, for example, has been cited 
to explain the forced adoption of new building methods in Leicester, effectively absolving 
the local authority of responsibility for building using a technically flawed system.
12
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Yet, contradictorily,  Ministry influence over the level of building during the 1920s 
has also been characterised as essentially passive or negative: it did little to initiate but 
rather either rubber-stamped local authority proposals, or rejected them.13  Moreover, 
recent national studies suggest that a local culture of enthusiasm for alternative methods 
frequently preceded, exceeded or otherwise acted in tandem with central government 
predilections, and lay beyond mere economic constraints.14 Nor should we ignore the 
richness and variability of the interplay between officials and representatives locally and 
nationally.  Local authorities today still retain degrees of democratically invested 
autonomy: where policy outcomes reflect the relative power and resources of each 
government tier within a disorderly bargaining system of mutual power dependency, 
constrained by past practice, and only ultimately a central veto.15   Local ‗authority‘ was 
even more apparent in the inter-war period: nominally a ‗golden age‘ for civic 
government, where new responsibilities for social provision were being actively 
transferred by Westminster to local authorities (and away from other local bodies deemed 
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less trustworthy—notably the poor law guardians).16 In high profile areas like health 
provision, for example, it was local authorities that provided the major source of 
initiatives in default of central activity. City councils played a ‗major and identifiable‘ 
role in the social and economic life of their communities, while, politically, key 
‗autonomous‘ local characteristics remained intact.17   Thus, increased state intervention 
also brokered new local relationships: where civic identity through active citizenship was 
increasingly structured in terms of the willingness of municipalities to incur debt through, 
amongst other things, urban renewal programmes.18 Importantly, in both Nottingham and 
Leicester pre-war ‗progressive‘ laxity in matters of municipal welfarism was held in no 
small part responsible for Liberal atrophy, from which the other parties sought to benefit 
electorally.
19
  In short, therefore, the conditions existed for self-nominating progressive 
authorities to construct an enhanced reformist identity through locally initiated social 
provision.  
Undoubtedly, inter-war municipal expansion brought with it a greater local 
dependence on central grants.  Yet there is a suggestion, too, that the coercive 
governmental strategies of the nineteenth century were being relaxed.  The newly 
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established Ministry of Health (which was responsible for social housing provision) saw 
itself more as ‗general guide, philosopher and friend to local authorities‘ than had its 
Local Government Board predecessor.20  While such self-evaluations have obvious 
limitations, other commentators also noted the correlation between the ready deployment 
of local authority enthusiasms and the lack of exercise of a coercive function by 
government departments.21 Excepting immediately after the war, central government 
lacked the extensive administrative system needed to control closely local activity. Thus, 
during the 1920s central government left much to the localities, albeit that pound-for-
pound grants did encourage Whitehall‘s ‗constant interference‘ to ward against possible 
local extravagance.22   
In predicting local welfare outcomes it is generally held that by the mid1920s Labour 
administrations were showing a ‗greater enthusiasm‘ than other parties to construct social 
housing.  Spending on welfare provision, too, generally reflected Labour‘s strength on 
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councils (but was surprisingly unrelated directly to physical need).
23
  Quantitatively, a 
more radicalised Labour party certainly advanced significantly further, and earlier, in 
controlling Leicester (Table One).
24
  In Nottingham it was more growing Conservative 
strength—already well established before 1914—which erased Liberal civic government.  
A ‗resistance to socialism‘ nominally bound together the traditional parties, particularly in 
the early 1920s.  Nowhere was this ethos more strongly articulated and reinforced than 
through the local press (which notwithstanding this provided contemporaries and 
historians with a comprehensive commentary on civic affairs, determining ideas and 
public policy formation).25  The conservative/populist Leicester Mail was particularly 
intemperate in its universal criticisms of all things ‗socialist‘; much more so than the 
serious, ‗respectable‘ Nottingham Guardian, or the liberal-progressive, ‗popular‘ 
Leicester Mercury and Nottingham Journal.26   
Yet to focus on political divisions is, in part, to misconstrue local understanding.  
There existed an equally resonant yet contradictory discourse circulating through local 
newspapers and, more formally, through the conventions of civic politics, which stressed 
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consensual and civically-centric values, and placed political inclusivity above 
factionalism (except during the annual election periods). Thus the presence of loose ‗anti-
socialist‘ electoral coalitions, and lasting divisions over key ‗ideological‘ policies (for 
example, the use of direct labour), did not preclude active forms of co-operation within 
each council‘s committee system, with their shared intimacies of specialist knowledge, 
joint responsibility and endeavour (and on which Labour had ever increasing 
representation). Of the two cities, on balance it was in Nottingham that inter-party co-
operation was more evident—or rancour less apparent.  This partly reflected (but also 
contributed to) local Labour moderateness.
27
   
Unlike most major municipalities, neither city participated in the initial wave of 
prefabricated housing after 1918 heavily promoted by the Ministry of Health as an 
intrinsic ‗supplement to houses of ordinary construction already in hand‘ within an 
ambitious national reconstruction programme.28  Through its traditional designs, however, 
Leicester was still thought to be at the ‗forefront of housing initiatives‘ immediately after 
the war.29  By 1939, 35 per cent of its new 25,749 houses had been municipally 
constructed, against regional and national averages of 30 per cent and 27.9 per cent. 
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Within a specifying framework that equates radicalness with ameliorative provision, it 
might be expected that Tory-controlled Nottingham corporation played a less active role.  
In fact it built an even more impressive 65.5 per cent of the 26,080 city houses 
constructed (Table 2).
30
  Of these, new methods played a contrasting role in Nottingham 
and Leicester, contributing 3.4 per cent (slightly below the national average of some 4 per 
cent) and 16.5 per cent respectively to the public housing stock.  Both the Henry Boot and 
Crane systems used sought the substitution of crafts by unskilled labour (a process which 
attracted the suspicion of, and occasioned hostility from, organised labour).31  Each 
building system used precast concrete infill slabs in lieu of brick to form the external 
house wall.32  Henry Boot was one of the few national builders with experience of large 
contracts; over 8,000 of its non-traditional units were erected during the inter-war period 
(1,500 of which were in Leicester).  By contrast, the Crane system was developed 
independently by Nottingham‘s chair of Housing.  Used only locally—500 being built—
the system license was gifted free to the corporation.  It had, therefore, integral core civic 
and personalised status beyond that of a commercially imported system. All these non-
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traditional houses were completed between 1925-1927, during the second post-war 
national housing initiative.  In Leicester this also coincided with the period of maximum 
municipal housing construction, after which output fell considerably (Table 2).  Set 
against a backdrop of the earlier rejection of non-traditional solutions, this suggests very 
specific civic responses to local imperatives outside of the rubric of party specific 
ideology in two cities where economically no great variances existed. 
 
 
 Reconstructing Civic Perception 
Asked by its readers in 1924 if Leicester city council was ‗really in earnest over the 
shortage of houses‘, the Leicester Mail replied matter-of-factly that: ‗If they were as 
convinced to-day that homes must come first as they were in 1914-18 that winning the 
war must come first they would have a better record than they have.‘33  Acute housing 
shortages ensured that reconstruction objectives continued to carry disproportionate civic 
resonance into the 1920s, where national obligation was made more potent and 
immediate through local press renditions about city hardships.  Social reforming local 
policy-makers might privately hint at the potential political costs of opposing 
reconstruction —that ‗the working-classes would not be content with the old regime‘34—
but publicly it was presented as denying ‗brave heroes of the homes they needed.‘35  (In 
                                                 
33
 Mail, 3 May 1924. 
34
 NAO, CA ENQ/1920/136, Evidence of William Crane. 
35
 Nottingham Journal (hereafter NJ), 23 Sept. 1919. 
 12 
both cities war service was essentially a prerequisite for obtaining a council house.)
 36
  
Enrolling war as a metaphor for social obligation never obscured other constructs of civic 
responsibility—such as the linkages between public health, morals and improved 
housing.  Rather it bolstered the case for action.  
Ultimately local political readings of the success or failure of recent housing policy 
impinged significantly on the decisions to adopt non-traditional methods. The first 
preceptor of this was the number of houses constructed by traditional means under the 
1919 Act: where Nottingham completed 1,476 of the 3,700 dwellings planned to 
Leicester‘s 746 out of 1,500 before national expenditure cuts curtailed programmes.  It 
was not that Nottingham had had greater ambition or unanimity of purpose.  Indeed, 
already approved schemes had initially been abandoned for a lesser number of cheaper 
tenements.
37
 Moreover, Leicester‘s politicians had seen its targets as only preliminary.  
Nevertheless, government argued that the latter had consistently under-performed against 
even these more limited expectations.38  Critical, too, in formatting each council‘s self-
image through performance was the important area of central-local relations.  In 
Nottingham, it was Addison (Minister of Health) who intervened at the behest of the 
Housing Committee to save most of its original programme.  In endorsing the 
committee‘s ‗enlightened‘ garden city approach, vetoing any subsidy for tenements (to 
which he had partially agreed) and reminding councillors that default charges would be 
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levied nationally against them if they decided not to proceed, he ‗guided‘ the city‘s 
options.
39
  At a time when local authority inexperience was at its greatest, and Ministry 
‗interference in matters of detail‘ at its height,40 here was a relationship characterised by 
vacillation and open partisanship (when colluding with factions within the City Council), 
but also one based on negotiation.  Ironically, too, it also enabled Nottingham 
subsequently to construe its own achievements positively.  
In Leicester there was a marked absence of alliance building with central government 
agencies.  Indeed, the Liberal chair of the Housing Committee publicly ridiculed standard 
government designs ‗damaged by foolish ideas of economy‘: ‗they were convinced they 
could do better themselves….  Whatever the Government has touched it has spoilt‘.41  
Departing from ‗approved‘ designs involved the Committee in ‗protracted‘ discussions 
with Ministry officials. Other common difficulties aside, this meant that by the end of 
1921 Leicester could count only half the number of house units approved by Whitehall as 
in Nottingham. What Leicester‘s Housing Committee viewed as ‗the continued refusal of 
the Ministry to allow them to proceed with their work‘ evidenced a breakdown in central-
local discourse—from which neither benefited—where the Ministry curtailed new 
programmes until existing contracts were completed and conformity on costs and related 
specifications met.  The committee, however, continued to draw the backing of the full 
council and a civically-partisan local press.  Neither situation could last indefinitely.  
                                                 
39
 NAO, Housings Mins, 26 Sept. 1919; NJ 7 Oct. 1919; R. Smith and P. Whysall, ‗The Addison Act and 
the local authority response‘, Town Planning Review 61 (1990), pp. 194-7. 
40
 Ryder, ‗Council House Building‘, p. 62. 
41
 LM, 1 June 1921. 
 14 
Waiting lists continued to rise—from 2,115 in December 1920 to 5,747 by May 1924—
by which time only a meagre 3.1 per cent of local building labour was engaged on 
municipal schemes.
42
  ‗The Housing Committee had from the very beginning hindered 
progress‘, one member belatedly concluded.  ‗There was always something to object to 
with the regulations‘.43 Progressive local authorities traditionally had sought legitimacy 
and independence from central ‗expert‘ supervision by providing high local standards of 
service.44  In Leicester, however, mounting public criticism centred directly on an inverted 
sense of civic failure borne of inactivity. ‗―Hush!‖, say the Councillors when the housing 
question is under consideration. ―Don‘t face the real facts.  Talk around the subject.‖‘45  
Yet facts were not indiscriminate guardians of civic perception.  Nottingham‘s 
waiting lists also reached 6,184 by September 1924, rising by a further 25 per week over 
the next year. Yet proportionately little public criticism emerged.  On the contrary, 
reformers actively sought to ‗depoliticise‘ housing, so that reform acquired a pragmatic 
mantle. Crane publicly took leading fellow Tories to task for proposing alternative 
strategies, arguing that housing ‗was far too important a matter to be made the subject of 
an election cry‘.46 Meanwhile the committee busied itself building low rent 
accommodation for ex-servicemen, popular both with the Ministry and across local 
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political divides.47  By contrast, Leicester‘s attempts to build ‗low cost‘ housing to its own 
designs ended in the bankruptcy of several contractors, and more delays.48 
In Nottingham, the contrast with earlier shortcomings—encapsulated in the ‗dent to 
civic pride‘ in 1920 when the city was refused a boundary extension partly because of its 
past poor slum record49—helped ensure that later municipal provision (quantitatively and 
qualitatively) was constantly and favourably reported upon in an elevated, reinforcing 
(and uncritical) manner. Where formerly the press had been critical of the levels of 
interventionism (positively or negatively), by the early 1920s both its progressive and 
conservative wings were offering supportive homilies on housing tasks completed.50  
Undoubtedly Crane‘s location within the ruling Conservative party aided this process of 
assimilation.  Thereafter, although city politicians continued to differ over future housing 
policy, only a few commented negatively on municipally constructed estates now 
validated as icons of civic achievement.51  
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However, the disparities between the lack of immediate civic accomplishment against 
needs in Leicester produced a singularly more volatile condition.  When Herbert Hallam, 
now chair of Housing, refused again to apologise for the committee‘s past performance, 
notable were the press accolades awarded to his recently appointed Conservative vice-
chair for his ultimatum to his colleagues of ‗Get on or Get Out‘.52  Such directness in 
public was very unusual, particularly between fellow committee officers. Nor especially 
was it the product of a broader anti-socialist rhetoric against Hallam as a Labour nominee.  
Instead, it complemented the heightening press campaign against inactivity.  Indeed, once 
the committee took a more robust line, Hallam was re-presented as ‗Leicester‘s Busiest 
Man Today‘, assimilating a ‗mass of detail‘ connected with the ‗City‘s latest housing 
scheme‘ for which he has ‗done so much spadework in committee‘.53  It was, then, upon 
the question of civic leadership that the press took its stance (albeit that the Mail, 
idiosyncratically, called for a local housing ‗Mussolini‘ to 'smash' trades union tyranny), 
wedded to the belief that: ‗Not in Whitehall, but in Leicester, shall we find the solution to 
the great Housing problem.‘54  Nottingham‘s press, by contrast, never took up arms 
against its Housing Committee, which was deemed to be providing the leadership 
required. It is here, at a local level through the civic reportage of activity and inactivity, 
that the experiences of Nottingham and Leicester noticeably diverged in the adoption of 
non-traditional housing solutions. 
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 The Discourses of Crisis and Consensus in Civic Decision-Making  
The 1920s have been portrayed as the high point of a popular idealism linking civic 
welfare reform to the promotion of community identity and active citizenship.55  Within 
what McKibbin has labelled a ‗community of language‘, a socially inclusive local press, 
with its cross-sectional readership (in terms of class, political allegiance and gender) and 
high levels of sales, provided a ready medium for formatting such organic ideals.56 Key 
news stories were specifically selected for their capacity to involve its readership through 
an agenda that affected his own life or engaged his imagination. Yet local institutional 
leaders, symbiotically, also exercised ‗a decisive influence‘ on newspaper content as 
‗leaders of thought‘, for the papers relied heavily on them for their material.57  Within this 
closed environment, where the community was interpreted through its institutional 
structure, ‗the versions of events promulgated by powerful individuals within this 
institutional order become the established truth of communal life‘.  Yet as Franklin and 
Murphy point out, occasionally predilection, ‗the market for news‘ or the ‗forces in the 
inter-play of local politics‘ disrupted this tendency to normative social reinforcement. In 
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then brokering its own constructs of ‗city first‘ interest, the local press stepped outside of 
the ‗normal sheepfold‘ it inhabited to make and direct opinion independently.58  
Against a common backdrop of shortages, Leicester‘s active interest in non-traditional 
housing predated that of Nottingham by some six months.  This broadly reflected the 
greater disparity between its lack of achievements and its perceived needs-driven 
obligations as laid out through local opinion.  Its decision-making process, too, was 
truncated as intensive local debate created civic exigency.  In such circumstances, 
perhaps, expert validation had a key role. Indeed, one reason offered to explain the 
adoption of new methods in Leicester is supposedly rapidly changing attitudes within the 
Ministry of Health, which in strongly commending concrete methodology, left the City 
Council with ‗no alternative‘.59  Hallam was unquestionably resistant to the substitution 
of non-traditional methods: idealistically on aesthetic grounds of sameness, and because it 
was a comparatively untested and expensive alternative.  The Ministry bolstered this 
belief in traditional solutions by granting further allocations at a time when Hallam 
argued that local labour shortages were improving.60  Antagonisms between Leicester and 
senior Ministry officials were also easing, largely because local leaders now actively 
sought the counsel of their central counterparts within the general context of a more 
relaxed supervisory apparatus once government financial liabilities were limited to a 
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fixed sum per house under the 1923 and 1924 Housing Acts.61  Nevertheless, the initiative 
to use alternative methods came first from within Leicester, when it sought to erect 
‗temporary‘ timber houses (one solution, amongst several emergency measures, proposed 
by the Leicester Mail and certain hectoring councillors).62  The Ministry was also seeking 
progress through compromise.  It, therefore, reluctantly granted permission for this 
initiative.  This reluctance was understandable.  As Ruthen (Director General, Ministry of 
Health) pointed out, ‗a considerable amount of skilled labour was required to erect 
temporary houses and he did not want the Council to do anything that would retard the 
permanent housing programme.‘63  That on reflection the Ministry, the city‘s housing 
architect, and, after consultation, the city council, preferred ‗permanent‘ concrete housing 
at a significantly lower cost, simply made good sense.64  It does not, however, explain 
why the Housing Committee abandoned its longstanding predilections against alternative 
housing methods. 
There was, of course, nothing new in the Ministry promotion of non-traditional 
solutions, although a renewed interest had yet to be fully reawakened.65  Yet, 
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comparatively, national commendations were overshadowed by those already instigated 
by local politicians and, more particularly, by the Leicester Mercury (the city‘s other 
major daily newspaper).  In ratcheting up the tensions of civic neglect, the Mercury first 
surveyed the work being undertaken elsewhere: for example, that ‗Birmingham is 
tackling the housing famine in a way which is an object lesson to Leicester‘.  Here, 
apparently, was a city which had constructed six times as many houses since the war, and 
currently completing over 170 brick houses per month (as opposed to Leicester‘s 16); yet 
Birmingham was also ‗building concrete dwellings to relieve the housing shortage.‘  
 
And how is it that the Housing Committee, which on its own showing cannot produce brick houses, 
declined to go ahead with concrete building?  There is no adequate reason for such a conservative 
disregard of a material which has the virtue of not calling for skilled bricklayers, who are costly and 
unobtainable.  Leicester must build houses and the ―Mercury‖ will continue to concentrate public 
attention on a crying evil...  WE WANT HOUSES – NOT EXCUSES.66 
 
There followed an intoxicating tirade through May and June (where only exceptionally 
did the paper not carry a major lead, editorial or exploration on Leicester‘s housing crisis) 
and into July and August.  Firstly it asserted, directly or mediatorially (‗experts know 
that‘), the underlying merits of alternative methods: ‗Concrete Facts For City Council.  
Expert on Advantages of New Form of House Construction.  Time and Labour Saving‘; 
or appealed directly to the ‗common sense‘ of its readership – ‗What is the matter with 
concrete? The houseless do not care what materials are used… when modern 
improvements are made why should not advantage be taken of them?‘  The implicit or 
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openly stated assertion was always that ‗Concrete would solve Leicester‘s biggest 
problem in a very short space of time‘.67  Attesting to civic achievement elsewhere 
remained central to the validation process, cementing the perception of Leicester‘s own 
‗dilly-dallying‘ neglect.68  Even those not then building by non-traditional means were 
recruited.  ‗Nottingham‘s Hustle Puts Leicester in the Shade‘, reported the Mercury’s 
‗Special Correspondent‘. ‗The more fully I go into the housing conditions in the 
Midlands, … the more does the effort of Leicester appear dwarfed by that of 
neighbouring towns.‘69    
Finally, the Mercury concentrated unreservedly on the human cost of not building by 
concrete.  Key members of the Health Committee, Thomas Windley (for 46 years its 
Liberal chairman) and Walter Wilford (now its chair and also Labour‘s chief whip) first 
offered a bipartisan call for non-traditional solutions because of the ‗scandalous‘ threat 
posed to public health by homelessness and endemic overcrowding.70  This opened the 
floodgates to journalistic licence.  In one article alone, ‗Home, Sweet Home, No Longer.  
Families Suffer while Authorities Talk—and Talk‘, the Mercury alluded to children ‗not 
getting fair play‘, to falling property values because of overcrowding, the break-up of 
family life, of ‗decent working-class families‘ having to live in slum conditions all 
because: ‗Apparently, it is better for people to live in squalid hovels or crowd into rooms 
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in other people‘s houses rather than … have concrete dwellings.‘71 Many a lurid headline 
and story followed: of ‗People Herded in Rooms Suffering Untold Misery‘; or of terrible 
overcrowding ‗Driving Mothers Out of Their Minds‘, a quote attributed to Wilford, who 
concluded ‗our doctors tell us that as a result there may be an actual increase in lunacy‘.72   
With four times the readership, the Mercury‘s campaign always overshadowed that 
of the Mail‘s, which championed cheap, temporary accommodation through private 
enterprise and self-help; and opposed ‗concrete‘ solutions.  The Mercury itself was not 
unduly modest about its ‗considerable influence‘ in setting the civic agenda by 
programming council debates and focusing attention on achievement elsewhere.73  
Windley thought its ‗numberless articles and letters‘ had provided ‗a service‘ for which 
‗the public are greatly indebted.‘74  That other less sympathetic politicians dubbed its 
campaign a ‗wicked criticism, absolute perversion of fact, and a down-right lie‘ only 
gives credence to these claims and to their perceived impact.75  It was the press, too, that 
rode roughshod over the unwritten behavioural protocols muting sustained, publicly-
voiced criticism inside the council chamber, breaking down and reconstructing a new 
consensus. To this process, groupings inside the council attached themselves. Hallam‘s 
publicly expressed attitudes to ‗concrete‘, while not providing a precise measure, are 
instructive in assessing the determining impact the Mercury had: for during the campaign 
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he moved from outright opposition, to grudging acceptance and fulsome praise (the Boot 
system is ‗thoroughly tested … [and] will give entire satisfaction‘); even finally to 
outright hostility against those who subsequently sought delays (‗if we find anyone‘s head 
in the way we shall hit it‘).76   
This is not to dispute that the Housing Committee relied on Ministry officers to 
approve its proposals, and for impartial technical advice (on which professional authority 
central officials had historically based claims to positive leadership over local 
government).77  In both respects, the Ministry validated concrete‘s credentials as a viable 
constructional form designed to counter local labour shortages, the availability of which 
partially determined whether approval for a scheme was granted centrally.78  According to 
the Ministry‘s account of the decision-making process: 
 
We suggested to Mr Fyfe [Leicester‘s Housing Architect] that as the tenders for the wooden 
[temporary] houses had come out so high, he would probably be well advised to consider the question 
of concrete houses.  He might not get the first instalment of these so quickly … but in the long run it 
seemed probable that greater progress would be made this way.  Mr Fyfe agreed and said he would get 
in touch with firms who had erected concrete houses … so that he might have other proposals to put 
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Fyfe was already ill-disposed to accept high cost, temporary solutions (a conviction he 
thought the Housing Committee would share). The city‘s Health Committee, however, 
was pressing hard for immediate action.80  Thus within the climate of bullish expectation 
created in Leicester, central enthusiasms and tutelage were not outweighed by locally 
determined perceptions of necessity and its practical amelioration. Thus it was Housing 
Committee representatives that scurried half-way across Britain one weekend to seek 
private reassurances from Ruthen that their expansionary concrete houses programme was 
intact; and, shortly after, actively lobbying to build more ‗concrete‘ houses and to make 
Leicester a national centre for ‗experimental steel houses‘.81  Within an orchestrated 
ambience of civic neglect, therefore, Leicester councillors‘ late penchant for non-
traditional solutions flourished.  
The shortages endemic in Leicester were certainly present in Nottingham, too, so that 
slum housing previously closed was being reopened.  The corporation, however, initially 
placed its faith in stimulating private developers, who promised some 2,000 working-
class houses over a two year period under the subsidy provisions of the 1923 Act (half of 
which were to be rented to those on the housing waiting list).  While Crane supported this 
measure short-term as a pragmatic compromise, his own enthusiasm, and that of the 
Housing Committee generally, was for strategic municipal intervention, building directly 
for rent.82  
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The attempted restoration of even heavily subsidised private provision was not a 
success: six months into the probationary programme saw only 30 houses completed. 
Further hampered by local resource shortages, Nottingham‘s newly-found civic sense of 
progress was diluted and in danger of foundering. The committee‘s response was to 
suggest that local demand could ‗never be met unless some new form of construction is 
used.‘83  Thus, by the time Ministry officials approached the city to act as a demonstration 
centre for prototypes, steps had already been taken locally to sketch out its own rapidly 
‗approved‘ design for a concrete and steel exemplar.84  Local reactions to the proposals 
were favourable; indeed the call was for greater variety (initially only the Weir and Crane 
types were to be displayed).  The key voices raised against prefabrication came from a 
Labour minority, because the Weir system was nationally associated with the non-
payment of trades union rates.85  Mainstream Labour thinking neatly side-stepped this 
objection in two ways: by openly stating its preference for brick, circumstances 
permitting, and by praising Crane‘s design.  The ‗mere demonstration‘, it was argued, of 
the Weir house would ‗kill it‘, but when seen the public ‗would want a lot of those 
designed by the Chairman‘.86  Press accolades acted to minimise dissent: lacking the 
hyperbole of Leicester‘s campaign, they instead offered a reassuring meld of civic 
continuity, utility and progression:  
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the exterior of the house was attractively bright, contrasting gratefully with the severity of the average 
―council‖ house…. large numbers of houses can be erected by mass production in a very short time…. 
The houses are fitted with electric fires, cooking stoves and boilers [etc.]….  [and are] both convenient 
and of elegant appearance, as would be expected from any work that is designed by Mr. T.C. Howitt, 
who has been so successful in regard to the housing schemes carried out by the Corporation in recent 
years….  It might be added that as soon as Mr. Crane‘s method of construction was submitted to the 
Ministry of Health it was at once approved by their principal architect….  ‗fire away‘ with the 
enterprise.
87
   
 
‗Here are houses such as hundreds and thousands of people would jump at the chance of 
living in‘, commented the conservatively-orientated Nottingham Guardian.  ‗Mr. Crane 
has realised for a long time past that if people are to wait for houses constructed in the 
orthodox manner, most of those now without houses will probably never get them.‘88 
The Crane prototype was Ministry approved and subsequently erected within three 
months.  A clear sense of purpose likewise spurred the Housing Committee to order 72 
Wild steel framed, brick clad houses.  Crane brushed aside what he labelled 
‗obstructionist‘ opposition, decrying claims that needs could be met by traditional means 
as being ‗too absurd to be contradicted.‘89 It was now simply a case of deciding how many 
Crane type houses to build.  Having originally opted for 500, the committee thought again 
and doubled that number. 
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Yet securing final approval for the package locally proved singularly more difficult 
than obtaining Ministry consent, which again readily granted its permission and a 
subsidy.  The city‘s Finance Committee was increasingly preoccupied with a rising 
capital housing debt.  Of concern, too, was that 30 per cent of the ‗Crane‘ site lay outside 
the city boundary, where the rates paid would be lost to another authority.  It proposed 
tactically, therefore, that initially only 500 houses be built, offered first for sale.  It was 
this compromise position which was finally adopted, amendments for the cancellation of 
the second 500 and for building the full allocation for rent under the more generous 1924 
Act being defeated.90   
Crane presented the case not only in terms of rapidity of construction but also as the 
‗biggest scheme for the relief of unemployment the Corporation had then undertaken‘.  Its 
relationship to civic self-esteem became apparent in other ways: sold as a technical 
innovation locally developed, and as a continuum of Nottingham‘s garden city ethos.  
Opponents retaliated likewise, branding the houses as unsaleable, ‗monstrous‘, ‗nothing 
less than large bird-cages.‘ Clearly significant divisions existed.  Yet as the Guardian 
commented, ‗obstructionist argument, even though plausibly based, received short shrift‘ 
when set against the 6,000 names on the waiting list.  ‗In any case now that the scheme is 
to go forward, public speakers should think twice before proceeding to undermine public 
confidence in the new form of construction.‘91   
It would be disingenuous to claim that Nottingham‘s newspapers consistently 
reported civic affairs through a consensual filter.  Nevertheless the coupling of  ‗city 
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before party‘ was prominently cast through the next two decades.92  The conciliatory, 
softer tones struck in Nottingham contrasted starkly with the strident campaigning and 
bitter criticisms driven by Leicester‘s press in the mid 1920s: where it claimed, for 
example, that city councillors ‗let themselves go with laughter at savoury bits about 
housing troubles‘.93  Yet as construction proceeded, the Crane houses did provoke 
controversy.  One senior Conservative alderman persistently brokered an alternative 
treatise that the houses were now ‗very widely criticised‘, with tenants complaining that 
you ‗could wipe the water off the walls‘ (claims the occupiers subsequently denied).  The 
Guardian‘s response, when he spoke again, was to offer an editorial and separate 
comment praising Nottingham‘s municipal ‗courageous enterprise‘, and specifically the 
great interest in, and anticipated benefits of, the Crane development.94 
Within the idealised constructs of civic consensus, dispassionate ‗objectivity‘ was 
never the first consideration, nor the first gaol.  When the proposed erection of a further 
500 prefabricated houses was repeatedly blocked, and finally whittled away to 
constructing fewer traditional buildings, again for sale, this too was presented by the press 
as ‗containing more than a germ of a satisfactory compromise‘.  To Crane, however, ‗it 
was all very disheartening‘.95  Twenty years later, he was more forthright.  ‗There was‘ he 
concluded, ‗a very large reactionary section on the Council at that time.‘96  Yet Labour 
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support also faltered.  Nottingham had already embarked on the first of several major 
brick built estates; these quite clearly were the models Labour favoured, instead of what 
some of its supporters ‗irreverently dubbed ―Kaffir Kraals‖‘.97    
Yet, it was in the conservative press that the campaign against the Crane house had 
briefly ignited to contest previously constructed agreement in an economic climate now 
more conductive to traditional methods.  Setting aside its earlier praise, this revised 
rendition of ‗city first‘ consensus relied instead primarily on traditional mantras.  
Wollaton Park (the proposed site) was, as the Guardian put it, ‗a scene of almost 
unrivalled sylvan beauty‘, which was likely ruined if yet more ‗monotonous‘ concrete 
houses were laid down. (As importantly, it was a residential area and further development 
threatened property values).  The cost to the rates in lost revenue when building outside 
the city boundaries was again raised.98  Crane appealed in vein to the Council ‗not to be 
influenced by anything that had been said in the press‘, as the tide of reported opinion 
turned against him. 99  In fact, within the confines of party peculiarities, the press and the 
council largely spoke with one voice —— against Crane.  Yet, the construct of ‗city first‘ 
consensus remained to the fore, because even in defeat Crane‘s endeavours drew praise.  
‗It was very pleasant to find‘, recorded the progressive Nottingham Journal, ‗that no 
matter how members of the Council may differ on matters of policy they desired heartily 
to recognise disinterested endeavour put forth in the interests of the city.‘100  
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Concrete had its critics in Leicester too: its mayor, for example, labelling it ‗a white 
elephant on the city‘.  As in Nottingham, civic politics occasioned divided loyalties, so 
that a Tory election assault on the Boot house provoked an equally robust response from 
Conservatives serving on the Housing Committee.101   The complaints in Leicester, 
however, carried greater substance.  Poor supervision and design faults were only 
partially rectified by subsequent modifications, so that while quality improved, 
complaints continued too.102    In fact, a government sponsored enquiry had identified 
potential design shortcomings contemporaneously.103  Yet while Nottingham was largely 
content to cancel its half-completed prefabrication programme, Leicester persevered with 
the second and third phases of the Boot scheme, so that some 1,500 of the technically 
inferior Boot houses were finally constructed (although phase one was already acquiring a 
reputation as a sink estate).104  Why was this?  Leicester‘s councillors and professional 
advisors were certainly not instinctively wedded to new technological solutions. Nor 
should we absolve councillors of their responsibility by maintaining that ‗the use of 
concrete was forced on the Corporation by central government‘; even if that was true 
initially—a dubious assertion—it does little to explain an enthusiastic perseverance with 
a partially flawed methodology.  Cancellation (as in Nottingham on less ‗concrete‘ 
grounds) was always an option, but not one favoured generally by Leicester‘s opinion 
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formers, excepting the Mail.105  After a succession of local campaigns, which started in 
the 1930s, the last of the Boot houses are now finally being demolished.  Yet subsequent 
shortcomings should not blind us to the dominant culture of response and obligation 
created locally in the mid 1920s, underpinned by a strongly pejorative construct of past 
performance and of contemporary crisis. It is against this backdrop that defensive, locally-
made decisions and attitudes were struck, and once validated, endured.  This, too, speaks 
to the authority of locally-conceived discourse as nationally non-traditional housing fell 
out of favour. 
 
 
‘Local Authority’ and Civic Perception 
Several points emerge from this discussion.  Firstly, local councils clearly did retain 
authority over significant areas of policy formation at all stages of the decision-making 
process in these early years of mass state housing.  This authority, however, was not set at 
a fixed rate.  Initially, at least, it was determined by the degree to which local/national 
objectives and practices coincided within a loose system of shared values.  While 
coercion was always an option for central government, especially under the 1919 Act, 
encouragement and/or tutelage was the stronger ethos. If an antipathetic relationship held 
sway neither party benefited, but the costs were greater for civic leaderships. Local 
political elites in Nottingham and Leicester were bound to a spatially immediate and 
personalised construct of civic improvement, where progressive self-image was 
                                                 
105
 Newitt, ‗Slums to Semis‘, p. 66; Mail, 1 Oct. 1925. 
 32 
defined—albeit ambiguously—by local performance.  Here a tarnished civic image had 
both an individual and collective cost locally.   
In each city a strong belief existed—propounded particularly through the press—that 
the ‗solution to the great Housing problem‘ would be (and was) found locally, not in 
Whitehall.  In the diffusion of new methods of construction, we find several exemplars of 
this ideal. Against a common national backdrop of research and promotion, in 
Nottingham it was at a local level that the key impetuses (and resistances) were to be 
found: as it designed, implemented and ultimately terminated its own programme. Yet 
developing its own system placed Nottingham in a clear minority amongst local 
authorities.  In Leicester‘s case, by contrast, central impetuses were stronger: in terms of 
validation, initiation and—through contributing negatively to local housing shortages—in 
providing a civic environment in which non-traditional ideas could flourish.  Nevertheless 
it was locally that the campaign to implement new ideas exploded.  
Most interesting, perhaps, is the centrality of self-perception within the civic decision-
making chain.  While each city reacted to ‗hard measures‘ of local social need and 
economic constraint, decisions were also strongly filtered through a distinctly local 
culture of understanding which drew powerfully on each city‘s past and present situation. 
Political decision-making depended less on those spheres of influence frequently used to 
predict outcomes (notably contemporary party divides) than on the city‘s intrinsic view of 
itself.  Such perceptions, too, were grounded less on a mathematically precise equation of 
needs against provision, than on more subtle shades of interpretation, reportage and 
constructions of political community: of what might, perhaps, be provided, and how 
municipal performance measured against this.  This, in turn, influenced how each council 
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viewed itself and was viewed locally by others: in our examples, against a common 
backdrop of a progressive agenda, ultimately as either as a body in crisis or one 
consensually driven forward.   
It would be a misnomer to suggest that even within this circular process of 
interpretation and reinterpretation only one unitary civic perception existed at any one 
time.  What is evident, however, is that from starting positions which were roughly 
congruent, facing problems which were broadly of the same magnitude, these two 
political communities came to be portrayed—and to a lesser but still significant degree to 
see themselves—in wholly dissimilar terms. Physical performance by itself does not 
account for this divergence: waiting lists rose equally and constantly in both cities, and 
both also encountered significant problems in raising housing output (albeit that 
Nottingham performed better in the immediate post-war years).   
Within a politically intimate system, in each city ‗progressive‘ issues like housing and 
health retained an underlying propensity to bypass local partisanship (aided by the 
practices of civic government where committee loyalties competed with party loyalties)  
The normative processes of the press, which strongly reinforced such consensual 
constructs, were overridden in Leicester only because of the city‘s continuing non-
conformity to this progressive ideal, so that the press itself stepped in to offer its own 
interpretation and leadership of a ‗city-first‘ solution to a major civic dilemma.  In 
Nottingham, by contrast, press compliance reinforced the positive decision-making 
process (although, ironically, short-term it could also act as a brake on initiative). Either 
way, in rendering an idealised construct, the press offered a ‗vision‘ against which non-
conformity jarred abruptly.  Press presentation counted because it tapped into and 
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energised those loosely defined, yet core expectations and contemporary shared beliefs 
organically registered within the civic community; and because local politicians presumed 
that it further influenced public opinion.  In this environment, at a time when progressive 
local authorities considered a dynamic welfare function as intrinsic to a city‘s identity, it 
is hardly surprising that local perception, too, took on great importance in defining and 
setting policy, especially when perception and press presentation walked hand in hand.    
 
